The role of the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division in the Battle of the Ancre, November 1916

 

 The Battle of the Ancre between the 13th and 19th November 1916 brought to an end the operations on the Somme.

By mid October 1916 Stuff and Schwaben Redoubts (German strongholds south of the Ancre River) had been captured, leaving the way clear for a final large-scale offensive either side of the river where there had been no major operations since the 1st July.

XIII Corps was to attack in the most northerly position, with 31st, 3rd and 2nd Divisions advancing towards Serre and Redan Ridge, next V Corps down to the River with 51st Division advancing towards Beaumont Hamel assisted by a mine in a similar position to that on the 1st July, and the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division advancing in a north easterly direction towards Beaucourt with II Corps south of the river, 39th Division to advance north to St. Pierre Divion with 19th and 18th Divisions to their right also to advance north. If all went well a number of objectives of the 1st July attack would fall including Serre and Beaumont Hamel.  Originally intended for late September bad weather caused postponement of the operations on a number of occasions until mid November 1916.

Sir Hubert Gough’s Reserve Army (which on the 1st November became the Fifth Army) had a massive concentration of artillery and a complex creeping barrage to support the infantry, the bombardment beginning on the 11th November.

The 63rd (Royal Naval) Division had fought on Gallipoli, arrived in France in May 1916 and entered the area of V Corps on the 4th October 1916.  In 188th Brigade were the Anson and Howe Battalions, and the 1st and 2nd Royal Marine Battalions.  In 189th Brigade were the Hood, Nelson, Hawke and Drake Battalions.  In 190th Brigade 1st Honourable Artillery Company, 7th Royal Fusiliers, 4th Bedfordshire and 10th Royal Dublin Fusiliers with 14th Worcestershire forming Divisional Pioneers.

On the 7th October the 190th Brigade took over a sector of the line from Serre to Beaumont Hamel, the 188th and 189th Brigades holding the trenches in the sector in front of the village of Hamel down to the Ancre River  The weather was execrable and trenches had been destroyed by the enemy, there were virtually no dugouts and the communication trenches ran across a conspicuous ridge under constant aimed fire.  In both the firing and support lines men could only stand and freeze in the mud with no room to walk or lie down.  Out of the line battalions went back to Mesnil-Martinsart or Engelmer but almost nightly exhausting working parties were sent up to the front trenches carrying up stores and ammunition for the dumps prepared for the eventual attack and digging assembly trenches on the slopes leading down to the valley of the Ancre.  On the 10th November final orders for the attack were received but by then battalions had fallen from an average strength of nearly 700 to barely 500.

63rd Division’s sector was about 1,200 yards in width, was immediately north of the Ancre River, the front running at right angles to the river valley which ran almost due east to Beaucourt, the Division’s objective.

63rd Division’s sector was about 1,200 yards in width, was immediately north of the Ancre River, the front running at right angles to the river valley which ran almost due east to Beaucourt, the Division’s objective.

On higher ground and about 200/250 yards from the assembly trenches was the German front line system consisting of three lines of trenches, the last (dotted green line) being the first objective.  Next came a valley with a road known as Station Road running through it climbing up a ridge running from Beaumont Hamel to Beaucourt Station and on the ridge was a strongly fortified position, the second defined objective the Green Line.  There was a hill up to Beaucourt Village and in front of the village Beaucourt Trench the yellow line the third objective, the final objective the red line a position to be taken up beyond Beaucourt village the capture of which being proof of success by the Naval Division.  The 1st objective, last of the German front trenches, and 3rd Beaucourt Trench, was to be attacked by 1st Royal Marie, Howe, Hawk and Hood Battalion advancing in four waves who would rest on the 1st and later 3rd objectives for the second attacking group to pass through.  The 2nd objective, fortified position on the ridge, and 4th Beacourt and position beyond, was to be attacked by 2nd Royal Marines, Anson, Nelson and Drake Battalions in similar waves resting on the 2nd and 4th objectives for the 1st group to pass through.

The preliminary British bombardment began on the 6th November concentrating on those areas around Beaumont Hamel and St. Pierre Divion which had caused major problems in the 1st July attack

Zero hour was at 5.45 am on the 13th November, but troops of the 63rd Division had reached the assembly area at 9 pm the previous evening and had to lie out in the open and in the rain only 200 yards from the German line. Lieutenant Colonel F. J. Saunders R.M.L.I. commanding the Anson Battalion was killed before the Assembly position was reached.  At 5.45 a.m. the British barrage opened on the German lines and the troops moved forward keeping well up to the shrapnel barrage which moved on about 100 yards in 5 minutes.  It was abnormally dark and with a thick mist.  The two Naval Brigades led the attack with the 188th Brigade on the left next to the 153rd Brigade of the 51st Highland Division.  The 189th Brigade was on the right the right of its line being the valley of the Ancre.  190th Brigade was in support.

On the left was 1st Royal Marine Light Infantry, next to the 51st Division units, then Howe, Hawke and Hood Battalions, with one company of the H.A.C. attached, the Hood next to the Ancre River.  Behind was the 2nd R.M.L.I., Anson Nelson and Drake Battalions and in support 10th Dublin Fusiliers, 7th Royal Fusiliers, 4th Bedfords and 1st Honourable Artillery Company, less one company attached to the Hood.

On the right, the Hood Battalion followed by the Drake encountered strong opposition, enfilade machine-gunfire from the left causing considerable loss and Lieutenant Colonel A. S.Tetley R.M.L.I. commanding the Drake was mortally wounded.  Still the German front line system was captured with 300 prisoners.  The company from the H.A.C. had been detailed to cover the right of the advance by seizing “The Mound”, a knoll which formed the southernmost piece of the German system north of the Ancre and then clearing the German dug-outs along the railway embankment, the task being accomplished after brisk fighting with trench mortars and machine-guns providing valuable support by 6.45 a.m.

On the right of the line the Hood Battalion perhaps because the officers commanding the first wave kept closer to the barrage with accurate guidance by compass bearing which preserved the direction of the advance throughout, passed through the German front system taking the three trench lines and clearing the dug-outs in the German third line, part of the vast underground works which ran from the Ancre to Beaumont Hamel.  In this operation Lieutenant Commander F. S. Kelly D.S.C. commanding “B” Company of the Hood was killed leading a successful attack on a machine-gun emplacement which threatened to enfilade the whole advance.

The Hood advance should have halted on taking the German trench system with the Drake going on to take the Ridge beyond Station Road, but the Drake had been drawn into the battle for the German trench lines on the left of the Hood front and had lost half of their effective force, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Tetley, Lt-Commander P.S. Campbell  was killed and Lt.-Commander Turrell wounded.  One Lieutenant and two Second Lieutenants with 75 men only remained.  The situation was resolved by Lieutenant Colonel B. C. Freyberg commanding the Hood deciding to continue the advance with 300 men of the Hood and  120 of the Drake and men from the H.A.C. company with a machine gun from 189th M.G.C. following the advance.

The combined attack was successful, dug outs in Station Road yielding 400 prisoners and the 2nd objective, the ridge was secured with a force of nearly 400 men and 9 officers under his command.

On the left of the advance the Hawke and Nelson Battalions had attacked in the mist at 5.45 a.m. but as the first wave approached the German trenches and with the barrage still on the German first line, a devastating German machine-gun fire broke out from a Redoubt between the first and second enemy lines and opposite the Hawke Battalion front.  About 20 men on the right managed to get past the Redoubt and isolated from the left flank and without officers fought under Colonel Freyberg’s command getting to the Ridge and the Green Line.  A Lewis Gun team also managed to keep with the barrage as far as Station Road keeping the gun in action until the conclusion of Colonel Freyberg’s joint attack.  On the right of the Redoubt a portion of “B” Company led by Lieutenant the Hon. V. S. T. Harmsworth passed the strong point and followed the barrage to the second German line where Lieutenant Harmsworth was wounded a second time, this time mortally, a majority of his little party also becoming casualties.  Of the remainder of the Hawke Battalion all that is known is that nearly 400 of the officers and men became casualties mainly falling round the Redoubt.

Whilst the garrison of the Redoubt was attacking the troops of the Hawke Battalion, the first two waves of the Nelson Battalion succeeded in forcing their way without very severe loss but fell well behind the barrage and lost half of their number in assaulting Station Road with bombs and use of the bayonet.  But the third and fourth waves of the Nelson suffered the same fate as the majority of the Hawke Battalion, falling in the front and second line of the German trenches  from fire from the Redoubt, the garrison being less involved with the Hawke and the mist concealing the whereabouts of the Redoubt, but no officers nor men of the Naval Division got within bomb or bayonet range alive and the artillery barrage missed the Redoubt entirely.

Next to the troops of Hawke and Nelson were the right hand battalions of 188th Brigade, Howe and Anson.  The leading companies of Howe had kept well up to the barrage and had entered the German lines and although their flank was uncovered by the failure of the attack on the Redoubt, only Lieut.-Commander Sprange and 20 men reached the third line but were unable to hold it and the enemy were able to move out from the Redoubt to re-occupy this position.  However detachments of about 180 from the Anson had been able to pass through the Howe Battalion and crossed the Station Road valley under the leadership of Lieut.-Commander Gilliland to reach the green line on the Ridge, their objective.

On the extreme left of the attack, the 1st and 2nd Marine Battalions met with disaster at the start from the German artillery, the four company commanders of the 1st Battalion (Captains V D Loxley, H Hoare, M C Browne and G H Sullivan) with very many N.C.O’s. and men were killed crossing no mans land in the first moments of the advance and before the German front line was even reached.  The third and fourth waves by heavy fighting established themselves in the first two enemy lines but the few left from the first wave advancing on the third line  lost heavily from flank fire and only isolated groups reached the dotted green line, the last of the enemy trenches.  The 2nd Marine Battalion following behind became involved in hand-to-hand fighting in he third line and fell for the most part behind the barrage so only a few were able to join Lieut.-Commander Gilliland’s party with another small group reported as in touch with the 51st Division troops west of Station Road.

It was plain that the Redoubt was causing a problem to the attackers and at 6.30 a.m. some Battalion H.Q. staff went forward to clear up the actual situation but the attempt failed, Lieut.-Colonel N. O. Burge and his adjutant Lieut. T H Emerson from the Nelson Battalion were killed and Lieut.-Colonel Leslie Wilson from the Hawke was wounded.  However Commander Ramsay Fairfax on the Howe Battalion front was able to establish a brigade report centre in the second German line and then began to organize a consolidation of the hold on the first two enemy lines.

There was a pause of 70 minutes on the Green line and then at 7.30 a.m. the barrage lifted heralding the attack on the Yellow line, Beaucourt Trench.  On the extreme left of 188th Brigade no advance was attempted, the Marines being in touch with 7th Gordon Highlanders from the 51st Division.  Colonel Freyberg and Lieut.-Commander Gilliland led two independent assaults on the yellow line with both groups reaching nearly the line without serious losses.  Colonel Freyberg’s position was on high ground of tactical importance whilst that of Commander Gilliland’s was overlooked by the enemy.  The general situation was now sufficiently clear and reports received at Divisional H.Q. enabled Major General Sir Cameron Shute to decide that 188th Brigade re-inforced by the 190th must fight its way across the German front line system on the left before he could exploit the success gained on the right by Colonel Freyberg resulting in a postponement of the attack scheduled for 8.30 a.m. on Beaucourt village.  The H.A.C. were sent up to reinforce Colonel Freyberg on the Beaucourt Trench line and reinforcements were sought from Vth Corps with fresh troops brought up through the Ancre Valley and the 111th Brigade of the 37th Division was placed at General Shute’s disposal.

On the left sector the troops of the 188th Brigade Battalions had been engaged in continuous fighting so that by 5 p.m. on the 13th November they had occupied and retained sections of the enemy lines up to and including the yellow line, Beaucourt Trench.  The advance had been ordered by Brigadier-General Prentice at 9.30 a.m. on the 13th November.  With the exception of Commander Ramsey Fairfax engaged in leading a bombing attack against the enemy attempting to move north along their second line from the Redoubt, all the other battalion commanders with a many men as they could collect pushed forward to the third German line, the dotted green line, and held it.  Lieut.-Commander Gilliland’s party was able to push on to the yellow line although suffering severe losses and remained in the southern section, with the enemy to his left in Muck Trench, until nightfall when the party was able to join up with Colonel Freyberg.  It was not until 4 a.m. on the 14th November that men of the Marine and Anson Battalions were finally able to advance and dug in on the Green Line, the Ridge, still in touch with a battalion of the Gordon Highlanders of the 51st Division.

Understandably on the night of 13th/14th November 1916 there was considerable confusion with trenches obliterated and distances impossible to calculate.  Two battalions from the 111th Brigade had been sent up that night to the Ridge were at 6 a.m. to attack Beaucourt Trench so enabling Colonel Freyberg’s force to include a battalion from 111th Brigade supported by 7th Royal Fusiliers from 190th Brigade  to advance on Beaucourt.

V Corps heavy artillery had maintained a slow bombardment throughout the night with heavy German retaliation on some parts of the front.  At 6 a.m. intense fire was opened on the first objective Beaucourt Trench on the front of 63rd division and Munich Trench opposite 51st and 2nd Divisions.  At 6.20 a.m the infantry advanced to attack.  13/Royal Fusiliers and 13/Rifle Brigade from 111th Brigade attached to 63rd Division from 37th Division advanced from Station Road with their right on Redoubt Alley (a trench running north  east  to join Beaucourt Trench north of Beaucourt village) but an initial loss of direction, corrected under machine gun fire from Beaucourt village and Muck Trench, further to the north east of the village, and the second objective resulted in the attack stalling so that the line held now by 13/Kings Royal Rifle Corps (also from 111th Brigade) was extended north-west for 300 yards, with 13/Royal Fusiliers and 13/Rifle Brigade being checked some 200 yards short of Beaucourt Trench and nothing more could be done until the right of 63rd Division attacked Beaucourt at 7.45 a.m.  This checking of 111th Brigade was according to a German account the critical point.  If the British movement developed north of Beaucourt the Munich – Frankfurt position could not be held.

At about this time, it being sufficiently light, two of three tanks which had left Auchonvillers (one being damaged by a chance shell before starting for the rendezvous) started to cross no mans land.  One stuck in the mud before reaching the German front line but the other was led into position by guidance from Lieutenant Alan Campbell R.N.V.R. but again stuck in the mud between the German front and support trenches but in a position to open fire on The Redoubt and a brisk bombardment  resulted in the German troops in and about The Redoubt surrendering, some 400 of the enemy being brought back to the British lines by a party from the 10/Royal Dublin Fusiliers from 190th Brigade.

The attack on Beaucourt village at 7.45 a.m. was the task of 190th Brigade which had managed to collect near Beaucourt Station 400 of the H.A.C. and about 80 of the 7/Royal Fusiliers.  This group advanced but came under heavy rifle and machine gun fire from Beaucourt village and had to halt and take cover on reaching the position held by troops with Colonel Freyberg.  At this critical point Colonel Freyberg, although wounded again, led the assault himself with a mixed detachment from the Howe, Drake, Hawke and Nelson battalions, the H.A.C. and the 7/Royal Fusiliers, straight into Beaucourt whilst the13th K.R.R.C. pressed forward south-eastwards through the village.  Little resistance was encountered and nearly 500 prisoners were collected from the cellars and dug-outs, a line being established round the eastern edge of Beaucourt with patrols being pushed forward as far as the protective barrage permitted.

The capture of Beaucourt was reported at 10.30 a.m. and by that time 13/Royal Fusiliers and 13/Rifle Brigade, with a fresh barrage for their renewed assault, were in possession of most of Beaucourt Trench where again there was little resistance.

That afternoon the hold on Beaucourt was consolidated.  Fears of a German counter-attack from the area of Baillescourt Farm  about a mile to the East of the village, where German troops were observed gathering in mass, came to nothing after a heavy artillery bombardment of the area East of the village.

Lieutenant Colonel Freyberg was brought back from Beaucourt that evening having been severely wounded by a shell his cool and capable leadership  which had carried the advance a mile into German lines on the 13th November and also the capture of Beaucourt was fitly rewarded by the award of a Victoria Cross.

At midnight the 37th Division began the entire relief of the 63rd Division, the 63rd Brigade of the 37th Division taking over the whole front, with the 111th Brigade remaining in support and in the old enemy front line the remains of the 188th and 189th Brigades.

At noon on the 15th November Major General H B Williams (37th Division) took over command from Major General Shute.   In the afternoon of the 15th November the 188th and 189th Brigades were finally relieved to march back to Engelbelmer, the 190th Brigade remaining temporarily to clear up the battlefield.

The losses of the 63rd Division were approximately 100 officers and more than 1600 men killed, 160 officers and 2,377 men wounded almost the whole in the twelve infantry battalions and machine-gun companies and more than three-quarters of these in the two Naval Brigades, 188th and 189th, whose allotted task in the Battle of the Ancre had inevitably exacted higher casualties than those suffered by the four Army battalions in 190th Brigade.

The citation for the V.C. awarded to Lieutenant Colonel Bernard Freyberg records “For most conspicuous bravery and brilliant leading as a Battalion Commander.  By his splendid personal gallantry he carried the initial attack straight through the enemy’s front system of trenches.  Owing to mist and heavy fire of all descriptions, Lieut. Colonel Freyberg’s command was much disorganized after the capture of the first objective.  He personally rallied and reformed his men including men from other units which had become intermixed.  He inspired all with his own contempt of danger.  At the appointed time he led his men to the successful assault of the second objective, many prisoners being captured.  During this advance he was twice wounded.  He again rallied and re-formed all who were with him, and although unsupported in a very advanced position, he held his ground for the remainder of the day and throughout the night under heavy artillery and machine-gun fire.  When reinforced on the following morning, he organized the attack on a strongly-fortified village and showed a fine example of dash in personally leading the assault capturing the village and five hundred prisoners.  In this operation he was again wounded. Later in the afternoon he was again wounded severely but refused to leave the line until he had issued final instructions.  The personality, valour and utter contempt of danger on the part of this single officer enabled the lodgement in the most advanced objective of the Corps to be permanently held, and on this point d’appui the line was eventually formed.”

 

 

 

 

 


 


 

 


 

 



 
 

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