Australian 3rd Division Memorial 

The Memorial is about 5 miles East of Corbie on the North side of the D1 road from Corbie to Bray-sur-Somme about 3 miles West of junction of D1 with D42 Albert - Sailly-Laurette road.

58th (London) Division Memorial Chipilly Somme. Erected by local people to the memory of the 58th (London) Division the Territorial division which recaptured the village on 9th August 1918. The inscription records “………was one of the only English divisions which in co-operation with the French Army and the Army Corps of Australia and Canada succeeded in penetrating the German defences between Le Quesnoy and Montdidier on 8th August 1918 resulting in the start of the German retreat which ended in the Armistice of 11th November 1918.” Chipilly offered an amazing site during the war: the valley bottom was transformed into a vast drinking trough where 20,000 horses came to drink every day.

Memorial to 1st Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, Cerny-en-Laonnois.

Memorial to the 1st Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment at cross road village of Cerny en Laonnais on the crest of the ridge of the Chemin des Dames, the 1st Battalion in 2nd Brigade and the First Division fought there in 1914.  In 1914 the only building there was a sugar factory.  Strongly defended by the Germans it became an objective of attacks by the 1st Division in September.  The Memorial is to the Battalion which captured the sugar mill in the initial attack on the 14th September 1914 and held it for a few hours. “On the 13th September we moved forward to a village and halted for several hours. Heavy guns are just on our left and have already opened on the enemy’s position across the Aisne.” The Battalion crossed the Aisne at Bourg and moved into billets at Moulin but were called out at daybreak and told to move.  The Battalion moved down the road to Vendrese and lay down under cover of a hedge with bullets falling all around.  “We are shortly moved up to Troyon to support the attack on the factory.  This was at 10.30 a.m. on the 14th, and two and half companies of the Battalion were sent up to the right of the 2nd King’s Royal Rifles, one company was ordered to support the Royal Sussex, the remaining half-company being held in reserve at Vendresse.  The position was reached, the factory carried and held; but the enemy was in great strength and counter-attacked heavily, while the Battalion ammunition supply had begun to run out and the Brigade was ordered to fall back to the ridge previously occupied, arriving there about 3 p.m. and “digging in.” The loses incurred on this day by the Battalion in this its first general action of the war amounted to 14 officers and over 500 non-commissioned officers and men, killed, wounded and missing and in “B” Company alone 3 officers out of 5 and 175 out of 220 other ranks were casualties.”

Cambrai Memorial Louverval Nord

The small village of Louverval is on he North side of the D930 Bapaume to Cambrai road, 13 kilometres/about 8 miles North East of Bapaume and 16 kilometres/about 10 miles South West of Cambrai.  The Memorial stands on a terrace in Louverval Military Cemetery and the names are inscribed on a semi-circular wall.

The Memorial commemorates more than 7,000 servicemen of the United Kingdom and South Africa who died in the Battle of Cambrai in November and December 1917 and whose graves are not known.

The Memorial was designed by Harold Charlton Bradshaw with sculpture by Charles S Jagger which takes the form of bas-relief panels showing cameo details of trench life.  The Memorial was unveiled on the 4th August 1930 by Lieutenant General Sir Louis Vaughan.

Commemorated here

No. 42431 Lance Corporal Arthur Edgar Perks, 13th Battalion Alexandra Princess of Wales Own (Yorkshire Regiment)(the Green Howards) was killed in action on the 23rd November 1917.  He has no known grave and is commemorated on the Cambrai Memorial at Louverval.

Arthur Perks was born in Bloxwich, Staffordshire, enlisted in Birmingham whilst residing in Sutton Coldfield and served first as No. 164213 Royal Field Artillery.

His parents were George L Perks, a Grocers Assistant and Julia Perks.  The couple had 7 sons and 1 daughter.   Charles Ernest Perks was the eldest, born in Bloxwich in 1872.  Then Frederick G Perks born in Featherstone Staffs. in 1873 and Frank Lloyd Perks born in 1876 in Bloxwich.  Arthur Perks was aged 23 born in Bloxwich in fact on the 11th November 1877 and in 1901 working as a Barristers Clerk.  After Arthur came William (22) born in 1879 in Bloxwich and working as a Printers machine minder, Cyril (16) an accounts clerk born in 1885 at Darlaston, as was Cyril’s twin brother Henry who died in infancy, and Frances Madeline (7) born in Aston Manor in 1894.

Except for Charles, Frederick and Frank Perks, the parents and their three sons and daughter in 1901 were living at 43 Ettington Road, Aston Manor, then in the County of Warwick.

On the 21st March 1903 Arthur Perks married Harriet Taylor born in Bromsgrove and that year Aston Manor was added to the County Borough of Birmingham.

In 1911 Arthur (33) was working as a Law Clerk for Barristers (presumably in Chambers in Birmingham), and lived in a 6 room house “Oversley”, Jockey Road, Sutton Coldfield with his wife Harriet Perks (31)  and their daughter Joan Kathleen (2) born in Sutton Coldfield. 

The 13th (Service) Battalion was formed at Richmond in July 1915 as a Bantam battalion and went to Aldershot in 121st Brigade, 40th Division.  The Division had been formed at Aldershot in September 1915 and included units recruited in England, Wales and Scotland.  The four Welsh Battalions of the 119th Brigade were composed entirely of Bantams, men below the regulation height for an infantry soldier.  The other two brigades, the 120th and 121st were mixed in height but contained a fair proportion of Bantams and in consequence the 40th Division was considered to be a Bantam Division.  Although the 119th Brigade was made up of small but hardy men, the other two brigades included many that were considered to be underdeveloped and unfit for active service and so large scale medical examinations were carried out and one battalion which arrived at Aldershot 1,000 strong had over 800 rejected.  There was little reduction in the 119th Brigade but both the 120th and the 121st were reduced in such great numbers that each required two battalions to bring it up to war establishment. To achieve this, those men of each brigade regarded as fit for war service were amalgamated into two battalions, two battalions from the 120th and two from the 121st ceased to exist and new units were transferred from the 39th Division.  In May 1916 whilst awaiting orders to move to France the 119th Brigade was made up from the 19th Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 12th Battalion South Wales Borderers, 17th  and 18th Battalions The Welsh Regiment.  The 120th Brigade consisted of the 11th Battalion The King’s Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment), 14th Battalion Highland Infantry and the14th Battalion Princess Louise’s (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the 13th Battalion East Surrey Regiment (being two of the four battalions transferred from the 39th Division).  The 121st Brigade consisted of the 12th Battalion The Suffolk Regiment, the 13th Battalion Alexandra Princess of Wales’s Own (Yorkshire Regiment) and the 20th and 21st Battalions of The Duke of Cambridge’s Own (Middlesex Regiment) both of these battalions coming from the 39th Division.

Each Infantry Division had its own divisional artillery and the 40th Division’s was formed at East Ham and comprised the 178th, 181st, 185th and 188th Brigades of the Royal Field Artillery.

An analysis of 50 other ranks who died in January and 23rd November 1917 reveals that only 22 served solely with the 13th Battalion of the Yorkshire Regiment, 12 had formerly served with the Notts and Derby Regiment (Sherwood Foresters),  6 (including Lance Corporal Perks) with the Royal Field Artillery, 5 with the Yorkshire Dragoons, 1 each with the East Yorkshire Regiment, the Scottish Horse, and the Army Service Corps and 1 each with the 10th and 81st Training Reserve Battalions (formed in September 1916 where all recruits were sent for basic training) and these two battalions were designated for the Yorkshire Regiment.

Of those who had formerly served with another Regiment, a very few had served overseas before the 1st January 1916 and were thus entitled to the 1915 Star and so it is most likely that the majority transferred to the Yorkshire Regiment (i) if having served with the Sherwood Foresters on the 2nd April 1916 when the Battalion absorbed the 18th Sherwood Foresters or (ii) in 1915 and before June 1916.
On the 27th May 1916 the Battalion was at Woking when orders were received to mobilise for active service.  On the 4th June the Battalion, strength 34 officers and 995 other ranks entrained at Woking for Southampton but stormy weather delayed the crossing until the evening of the following day and Le Havre was reached in the early hours of the 6th June 1916.

By the 9th June concentration of the Division was completed some 10 miles west of Bethune in the Lillers area in Northern France in the sector of I Corps of the First Army and at once units of the Division were attached to formations of the I Corps for training.

Billeted first at Ham-en-Artois (North of Lillers) and then at Maisnil-les-Ruitz (south of Bethune) the Battalion was in training going on the 28th June to Calonne for instruction in trench duties, returning to Maisnil on the 2nd July.  In this period of trench training the Battalion had 8 men killed and 2 wounded.

On the 3rd July 1916, the 121st Brigade took over the Maroc sector West of Loos, the Battalion being in reserve and billeted in North Maroc and this was the commencement of a series of tours in the front, support and reserve lines.  The Battalion remained in this area until the end of October 1916 and then, following various moves in Northern France on the 11th December 1916 the Battalion arrived at Sailly Laurette on the Somme River some 11 miles East of Amiens.  Immediately after Christmas 1916, the 40th Division relieved the 33rd Division in the sector to the furthest right of the line, the Division to the right of the 40th being the 15th Division of IX Corps of the French Tenth Army.   The line was between Bouchavesnes and Rancourt, about 8 miles North of Peronne.

The whole countryside was a churned-up mass of mud as a result of the vile weather and of the battle which even yet had still not petered out.  Constant rain was varied by spells of intensely cold weather and some very heavy snowfalls. Billets in the back area Bray to Curlu were camps of dirty, wet and decrepit huts whilst the front “line” consisted of a mass of shell holes, a general sea of mud and lakes and lagoons of icy water.  Villages on the map in reality were no more than flattened brickwork.  All supplies of ammunition, water, rations, clothing, etc., had to be taken up on pack animals.

In September 1916 the Germans had begun the construction of a new system of defence from Arras through St. Quentin to the neighbourhood of Vailly on the Aisne.  The work itself was mainly carried out by Prisoners of War and forced labour.  Known by the enemy as Siegfried-Stellung and by the Allies as the Hindenburg Line, it was not a line but a defensive zone, sited as far as possible on a reverse slope with artillery observation posts, piquet lines with machine-guns in shallow dug-outs, concrete machine-gun emplacements, a better concentration of artillery, with generally three belts of barbed-wire each 10 to 15 yards in depth and 5 yards or more apart.  The consequences of the Battle for Verdun and fighting on the Somme meant that Germany was too weak to cling to all the positions held in late 1916. A strategic withdrawal to the new defensive zone would reduce the line by over 40 kilometres and would mean less troops being required to man the defences and would also enable a substantial strategic reserve to be established to counter threats wherever these appeared.

A general withdrawal of the German Armies to the Hindenburg Line had been anticipated for some time.  Whilst the disengagement had begun towards the end of February 1917, the retirement itself was performed in a single large movement mainly over three days and nights between the 16th and 19th March 1917.  A “scorched earth” policy followed with devastation wreaked over the whole area evacuated by the enemy.  Larger towns were literally razed to the ground, in villages virtually every building was either blown up or burned down, trees were felled across the roads, huge mines were exploded at road intersections. Every bridge over the Somme and other rivers was destroyed , railway lines were torn up, no supplies of any sort were left behind, delayed action bombs were planted and thousands of booby traps were laid. “Crows feet” were sown in river bottoms, designed to puncture horses’ hooves, nearly every well had been defiled and every pond polluted.

On the 6th March the 121st Brigade was relieved and the Battalion marched first to a rest camp near Maurepas, to the North of the Somme River, and then on the 15th March  went forward again to the Clery sector, about 3 miles North West of Peronne.  Patrols from the Battalion verified the fact that the enemy was falling back.  On the 16th March an enemy machine-gun had been noticed in a crater on “C” Company’s front and it was decided that this crater should be seized and on the afternoon of the 17th March it was rushed by a party of 10 men under 2nd Lieutenant Mason.  It was found to be empty, the enemy having gone back, but the machine-gun was a lure because there was a trip wire attached to some bombs which exploded wounding 4 men in the group. The next day, 18th March patrols pushed forward as far as Mount St. Quentin northwest of Peronne which was found to be burning.  Elements from another battalion from the 40th Division, the 13th East Surrey Regiment, had passed through Peronne that day.

On the 24th March the 40th Division was withdrawn to Corps reserve being employed on the essential task of road-making, without roads the British could not follow up the retiring German forces.  On the 6th April the Battalion moved forward again taking over front-line trenches opposite Gouzeaucourt about 10 miles South West of Cambrai.  The front-line faced the strong German held villages of Villers Plouich and Beaucamp and the 40th Division was to capture by assault these villages and gain a foothold on the higher ground beyond.  The 119th and 120th Brigades were to be the attacking Brigades, whilst the 121st was to hold two battalions and a machine gun section in readiness to support either brigade as required: the Battalion was to support the 119th Brigade if necessary but was not called upon and on the 25th April the 121st Brigade relieved the 120th Brigade in the captured village of Villers Plouich which was heavily bombarded by the enemy until the Battalion was relieved on the 2nd April losing 11 men killed and the C.O. Lieutenant Colonel B G Baker, Captain Kirby and 20 other ranks being wounded.

The Battalion remained in this general sector until the 9th/10th October 1917 when the whole Division was relieved, the Division going to the VII Corps area ending up in the area of Lucheux some 5 miles North West of Doullens for training in thickly wooded valleys, that is training in wood fighting.

The Division remained in this area until mid November 1917 when the Division began a move forward which would lead to its transfer to IV Corps under Lieutenant General Sir C L Woolcombe and participation in the Battle of Cambrai.

In March 1916 the Heavy Section of the Machine Gun Corps was formed under the command of Colonel Ernest Swinton, the title being an attempt to hide the formation of a tank corps.  In October 1916 Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Elles was appointed to command the tank units in France and promoted to Brigadier his chief staff officer being Lieut. Colonel John Fuller.  In July 1917 the Tank Corps was formed and Colonel Fuller turned his attention to considering whether other parts of the Western Front than the Ypres Salient (then involving two Armies) offered possibilities for the use of tanks.

One such sector identified was the Cambrai area held by the Third Army under the command of General the Honourable Sir Julian Byng who had the support of three most experienced Corps Commanders, Lieutenant Generals Sir Charles Woolcombe (IV Corps), Sir William Pulteney (III Corps) and Sir Thomas Snow (VII Corps).

The area was rolling chalk downland dotted with villages, copses and woods of various sizes of which the two largest were Bourlon Wood, a dense and largely undamaged forest about a square mile in area on a ridge behind the German lines, Bourlon village being to its north west and Havrincourt Wood most of which was immediately behind the British lines twice the size in area but the Germans had cleared trees to give their artillery and infantry improved fields of fire.  Between the woods ran the Hindenburg front and support systems.  Crossing the front lines from north to south were the roughly parallel Canal du Nord, still under construction, and therefore dry, (to the west)  and Canal de l’Escaut, also known as the St. Quentin Canal (to the east).  Between these two canals was an area about 7 miles wide and 12 miles deep, the Sensee River running east-west and about 6 miles north of Cambrai forming the northern boundary, the southern boundary the British front line.  Two features dominated the area, the hill of Flesquieres and the wood crowned ridge of Bourlon swelling on the north-east horizon like a great bastion flanking the city of Cambrai.
 
In August 1917 Brigadier General Hugh Tudor, commanding 9th Division’s artillery, conceived the idea of a surprise attack in IV Corps area involving the latest developments in artillery avoiding the necessity of registering the guns coupled with the use of tanks to crush flat the enemy wire which usually had to be subjected to a long period of destruction by artillery fire.  The idea was discussed with the Chief Staff Officer of IV Corps and forwarded to Third Army who in late August and mid September constructed a plan adding the use of cavalry to exploit any successful breakthrough of the Hindenburg line.  Sir Douglas Haig  believed that the Ypres Offensive, still in progress, would give him success but by early October it was obvious this was not going to happen and Haig gave his approval for Third Army to proceed with preparations for the attack.

The plan for the offensive at Cambrai explained by General Byng at his Army conference on the 26th October was based on the general lines approved by Sir Douglas Haig.  It was also on the 26th October that, following the Italian disaster at Caporetto threatening the total collapse of Italy as an ally, the War Cabinet had instructed Sir Douglas Haig to send at once two divisions to Italy and a further two divisions later.

The Cambrai objectives were defined as (1) to break the enemy’s defensive positions by a coup de main with the help of tanks; (2) to pass the cavalry through the break; (3) to seize Cambrai, Bourlon Wood and the crossings of the Sensee river, cutting off the German front-line troops between the river and the Canal du Nord; (4) to exploit the success by advancing north-eastward and rolling up the Germans from the south.

The plan was amended following further discussions and in final form was issued by the Third Army on the 13th November and the three stages of the offensive were described as : (1) the break-through of the Hindenburg Position, the seizure of the canal crossings at Masnieres and Marcoing, and the capture of the Masnieres-Beaurevoir line beyond; (2) the advance of the cavalry through the gap thus made to isolate Cambrai and seize the crossings of the Sensee river; and the capture of Bourlon Wood; (3) the clearing of Cambrai and of the quadrilateral St. Quentin canal-Sensee river-Canal du Nord and the overthrow of the German forces thus cut off.  It was vitally important that the ridge occupied by Bourlon village and wood be captured by IV Corps on the opening day since it offered observation into the rear of the German positions to the north and west as well as over the attack front. 

The Cambrai assault opened at 6.20 a.m. on 20th November 1917.  A thousand hitherto mainly silent guns deluged the enemy positions with high explosive and shrapnel and simultaneously 476 tanks went forward.  Of these 98 were reserved for bringing forward supplies, reporting by wireless from the battlefield and removing barbed wire with grappling irons to enable the cavalry to go forward.  The remaining 378 were fighting tanks whose tasks were to crush the barbed wire and shoot up enemy defences but also to cross German trenches with the aid of bundles of brushwood carried on the tanks to be dropped into German trenches over which the tanks could then safely pass. After the tanks came the six divisions of infantry whilst above flew 14 squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps for observation and bombing of airfields and other targets and to harass the German ground forces.

By 8 am British tanks and infantry had overrun the Hindenburg Main Line over a 6 mile stretch between the two canals.  By 11.30 a.m., except in the centre at Flesquieres, they had taken the Hindenburg Support Line as well.  By early afternoon an advance to a maximum depth of over 4 miles had been accomplished, with at least 2 German divisions put out of action and the loss of about 4,000 British casualties.  179 tanks had been lost mainly through mechanical breakdown with many others in need of repair and their crews exhausted. However no strategically important territory had been captured and the cavalry proved to be an ineffective arm but it remained the only arm of exploitation that any General on the Western Front possessed.  The main body of the Cavalry Corps was ineffective mainly because the assembly areas were some 12 miles west of Fins, the concentration area itself some 5 miles behind the British front line.  Contradictory orders were passed to 1st Cavalry Division and the capture by infantry of crossings over Canal de l’Escaut to the east was vital as the canal constituted a truly formidable obstacle for mounted troops.  Whilst the main bridges over the canal had been rendered unusable, about a mile east of the main bridge at Masnieres was an undamaged wooden bridge entirely suitable for cavalry but not referred to at all in any of the operational orders for the Cavalry Corps.  Whilst the main body was ineffective, there are examples of flexibility of the cavalry at local level when two troops of the Northumberland Hussars one dismounted and the other mounted attacked German rifle and machine gun posts holding up the advance of 12th Division frontally and galloping the positions from the rear resulting in the surrender of the enemy and capture of 2 field guns and a squadron from the 7th Dragoon Guards galloped Noyelles village, when the enemy machine-gun fire was high and did no damage capturing the village and taking 35 prisoners. 

The attack by the 51st Highland Division to capture Flesquieres continued throughout the afternoon of the 20th November but no properly organised assault of tanks and infantry was organised.  Late in the afternoon 6 tanks succeeded in entering the village but the German defenders moved rapidly into their dugouts and as the tanks withdrew and the infantry moved in the enemy emerged forcing an infantry withdrawal.  By the evening however the 6th and the 62nd Division had reached positions to place the enemy in danger of being enveloped and during the night of 20th/21st November the German defenders were advised they could no longer be supported and they withdrew, abandoning Flesquieres.

It was hoped that 48 hours from the opening of the Battle must pass before the enemy could, using substantial reinforcements, build up a really formidable defensive line.  Early on the 21st November the British line began to move forward the 36th Division got to Moeuvres but determined resistance meant the tired soldiers of that Division were unable to overcome it.  Units of the 62nd Division got across the Cambrai road  to reach the fringe of Bourlon Wood but here there was very strong opposition, with so murderous machine-gun fire that all progress was arrested.  The 51st Division went forward to capture the village of Cantaing advancing further to enter the village of Fontaine-Notre-Dame.  The 10th Rifle Brigade had first taken then lost Les Rues de Vignes, an important position on the British side of Quinton Canal and whilst that afternoon the 11th Rifle Brigade got across the canal to push towards Crevecour, with the River Scheldt running on the further side, the river could not be crossed.

The end of the second day, 21st November, found the British Command faced with a difficult problem.  Sir Douglas Haig had to decide either to go on or to go back for his protruding salient into German territory was dangerous and quite untenable while Bourlon remained in the enemy’s hands.  The tanks had all been put into the original attack and Haig only had three reserve divisions. The forward position of the IV Corps lay under close observation from the Bourlon ridge and as a defensive front might be regarded as indefensible.  If the British troops could not establish a secure hold on Bourlon ridge a withdrawal to the Flesquieres ridge would be the wisest course. As well he was convinced that to engage the Germans closely on the British front provided the most direct means of relieving the pressure on Italy. His decision was to concentrate all British efforts upon the Bourlon ridge rising to a height of some 250 feet above the main road from  Bapaume to Cambrai.  From this road the ground slopes gradually upward to the ridge, some 600 acres of which was woodland, the trees being mainly fir with occasional oak with a thick undergrowth of hazel and aspens.  There were many tracks inside the wood but in places their sunken formation afforded any defenders a special tactical value.  From the western side of the wood, an unwooded spur projected marking the high point of the ridge.  The wood could not be encircled from the north except by capturing Fontaine-Notre-Dame, a village on the N 30 to the east of Bourlon Wood.  This village had been taken by and held by the 1/4th Seaforth Highlanders until the afternoon of the 22nd November when they were overwhelmed by substantial German forces.

On the 22nd November 1917 the 40th Division had been transferred into IV Corps and arrived at Beaumetz, 5 miles East of Bapaume.  At 4 p.m. that afternoon the Division was ordered to relieve the exhausted 62nd Division at Graincourt, its H.Q. to be at Havrincourt.  Orders were also issued for the attack on Bourlon Wood on the 23rd November, the essence being the 119th Brigade (Brigadier General F .P. Crozier) would be on the right, the 121st Brigade (Brigadier General J. Campbell) on the left and 120th Brigade (Brigadier General the Honr. C. S. H. D. Willoughby) in reserve.

The 40th Division’s Orders for the 23rd  November 1917 were simple: capture Bourlon Wood and the village and then form a defensive line running east to west, north of Bourlon village and with its right on the railway cutting to the east of the village. To the right of the 40th Division was the 51st (Highland) Division, whose task was to recapture Fontaine and “only if artillery fire is not heavy” push tanks and infantry round the north of Bourlon Wood for the capture of the village. On the left of the 40th Division was the 36th (Ulster) Division) whose task was to continue its attack along the Hindenburg support system on both sides of the Canal due Nord …….to capture Sains and establish an outpost line beyond.

The right brigade 119th with 16 tanks would clear Bourlon Wood, a front of 1,500 yards, the left brigade 121st with 13 tanks would capture the western shoulder of Bourlon Ridge and the village itself, a front of 2,000 yards and an advance of 3,000 yards.  119th Brigade had supporting artillery of 5th   and 77th and 181st Brigades Royal Horse Artillery.  121st Brigade had support from 178th, 310th and 312th Brigades of Royal Field Artillery. The 87th Heavy Artillery Group was to lend assistance to each Brigade.  In all 158 guns were to support the 40th Division.

On the night of the 22nd November 1917 the relief of the 62nd Division by the 40th Division was carried out in the face of many difficulties.  Owing to the muddy state of the by-roads and tracks too much traffic had to resort to the only good road, the Bapaume-Cambrai pave, which became badly congested: part of 40th Division H.Q. took 15 hours to cover 9 miles; petrol requirements for the tanks could not be completed and the smoke shell needed by the artillery was not delivered at all.

Zero hour was 10.30 a.m. on the 23rd November.  It was a day of cold winds with showers of sleet and rain.  Before dawn the battalions started to get themselves in position.  The 62nd Division’s earlier battle was much in evidence, wrecked trenches and barbed wire strewn with many dead – there had been no time to move them.  At daybreak aircraft allotted to support the infantry swooped over to fire into the wood.  At 10.15 a.m. tanks were to move in front of the infantry of 40th Division, who had never seen tanks before and there was no time for much explanation concerning combined tactics but a tank brigade commander commented later “the assaulting battalions followed the tanks magnificently.”  At 10.10 a.m. the artillery barrage came down along the edge of the wood and at 10.30 a.m. as tanks and infantry closed up, it lifted 200 yards and continued to do so every 10 minutes.  The heavy batteries opened for 3 minutes on certain track junctions within the wood and then lifted 100 yards every 3 minutes.

The 121st Brigade’s attack began from just to the North of the main road.  20th Middlesex Regiment with 6 tanks in front was on the right, its first objective being the spur jutting out from the Ridge and was then to attack Bourlon village from the south in conjunction with the 119th Brigade advancing through the wood itself.  The13th Battalion Yorkshire Regiment was in the centre, the Battalion at first to advance in conjunction with the 107th Brigade of the 36th Division to the West.  That Brigade was advancing in a north-easterly direction and then would veer and attack Bourlon village from the west.  At that point of time, the 13th Yorkshire was itself to attack the village from the west.   21st Middlesex Regiment was to move in support of the 13th Yorkshire Regiment to their left rear covering its flanks in the event of the 107th Brigade being held up.  12th Suffolk Regiment was the Reserve Battalion, to wait in the trenches south of the main road near Graincourt.  The Machine Gun Company was to open a barrage from the Sugar Factory, on the north side of the main road and about 1 mile from Bourlon Wood, covering the left flank, with one section to follow the infantry of the front line and assist their advance.

At dawn the outpost companies of the 13th Battalion began to suffer heavy casualties from enfilade fire from guns firing from the south east corner of Quarry Wood, an enemy position 3000 yards to the north west, and an area just west of the spur.  A message was sent to the artillery asking them to turn on two of the howitzers onto each spot.  At 10.30 a.m. the infantry began its advance across the treeless and gradually rising slope, across which ran a number of sunken tracks, German trenches and barbed wire.  It had snowed during the night and during the first stages of the advance there was incessant rain. At 11 a.m. the tanks followed by the infantry were seen crossing the spur but the 13th Battalion had already come under heavy machine-gun fie and without support on their left were forced gradually inwards.  The casualties to the battalion were now serious; Captain Mason, Lieutenants Stanfield and Phillips and 2nd Lieutenant June were killed and several officers wounded, one of whom Lieutenant Harold Walton died of his wounds on the 24th November 1917.  Nonetheless the Battalion pushed on and about 11.45 a.m. the left company of the 13th Battalion passed through the enemy’s trench system on the outer edge of the spur on the left.

At 12 noon the battalion scouts of the 20th Middlesex Regiment were seen entering Bourlon village at its south-eastern extremity but both the 20th Middlesex and the 21st Middlesex were stopped by continued machine-gun fire from the west.  About the same time the leading company of the 13th Battalion captured some 60 prisoners in dug-outs about half a mile west of the southern extremity of Bourlon village but a German counter-attack freed these prisoners and few of the escort survived.  The tanks on the spur were suffering severely from armour-piercing bullets and 3 out of the 6 were put out of action.  At about 12.30 p.m. the left company of the 13th Battalion having suffered very heavily was compelled to fall back to the support and reserve companies just south of the village.  Half an hour later the situation had improved, the support company of the 13th Battalion then on the left had reached the western outskirts of the village and the reserve company had got up to the southern edge.  The right company had been seen to enter the village but for the moment no more was seen of them; the company commander had been killed.  The resistance of the Germans was now everywhere very marked and their artillery was active and persistent.  However the 13th Battalion’s left company had established itself in a house near the chateau, at the extreme western edge of the village, but was soon ejected and only a few stragglers were able to rejoin the reserve company south of the village.  By late afternoon and dusk coming on it was plain that Bourlon village could not be successfully attacked without reinforcements and orders were given to consolidate the ground taken.  A small local counter-attack by the enemy in parties of about 20 strong advanced to within 100 yards of the new line but were dispersed by rifle and Lewis gun fire.  When darkness fell the units of the 121st Brigade were strung out from Bourlon village to the sunken road about a quarter of a mile north west of the Sugar Factory on the Bapaume-Cambrai road.  Some soldiers from the 13th Battalion were out of communication but still in Bourlon village, the rest were intermingled with the two Middlesex Battalions on the spur.
At 5.15 p.m. Brigadier General John Campbell (121st Brigade) received a message “the Yorks (13th Battalion Yorkshire) and 21st Middlesex are practically obliterated.”

Soon after midnight on the 23rd/24th November the 13th Battalion was relieved by the 19th Hussars, the Battalion moving back for 3 days spent in the neighbourhood of the Sugar Refinery.  On the evening of the 26th November the Battalion moved back through the former Hindenburg Line to pass into reserve, moving by train on the 27th November to Bellacourt and billets.

Of the 25 officers and 450 other ranks of the Battalion who attacked Bourlon ridge and the village on the morning of the 23rd November, of the non-commissioned officers and men , less than 100 came back and no more than 8 of the officers including Battalion H.Q.

Four of the officers were killed in action on the 23rd November 1917, Acting Captain Richard Mason. 2nd Lieutenant Frank Stewart Philips and 2nd Lieutenant Charles Walter Tune have no known grave and are all commemorated on the Cambrai Memorial at Louverval, 2nd Lieutenant Thomas William Stanfield is buried in Anneux British Cemetery, Nord.  Anneux was captured by the 62nd Division on the 20/21 November 1917 and over-run by the enemy on the 6th December.  It is just to the south of the Bapaume-Cambrai road. Of the officers wounded on the 23rd November, one Lieutenant Harold William Walton died on the 24th November 1917 and is buried in Rocquigny-Equancourt Road British Cemetery, Manancourt which is about 8 miles North of Peronne and just over 7 miles South East of Bapaume.

Of the NCOs and men, 44 (including Lance Corporal Perks) were killed in action on the 23rd November 1917 and with one exception have no known grave and are all commemorated on the Cambrai Memorial at Louverval.  Private John Macrae is buried in Hermies British Cemetery, Pas de Calais.  Hernies is a town about a mile south of the Bapaume-Cambrai road and some 3 miles south west of Flesquiries Ridge.

In the 40th Division the other Brigade, the 119th Brigade (Brigadier General F.P.Crozier) with 16 tanks of G Battalion Tank Corps. had the task of clearing Bourlon Wood. By about 12.30 p.m. the 19th Royal Welch Fusiliers had reached the northern edge of the wood and a line of posts was established round the north-eastern edge of the wood extending on the right to the Fontaine-Bourlon road.  On the left the 12th South Wales Borderers had met with fiercer opposition, 2 tanks which had worked their way along the western edge of the wood proved invaluable but progress up the wooded slope was slow and the losses of the battalion in officers and NCOs were heavy.  Nevertheless the right company reached and entered the houses at the eastern end of Bourlon village whilst the left company was still struggline forward in rear.  Then a German counter-attack from the village pushed the left company back to the Fontaine-Bourlon road and the right company, finding itself isolated, fought its way out with the help of a tank and extended the line along the road.  About 3 p.m. a heavy German bombardment was followed by a powerful counter-attack which after desperate fighting was pushed back.  As the light faded the crest of the ridge was won and only the northern slope of the wood remained in German possession. 

About 8 p.m. two companies from a reserved battalion arrived and eventually covered by patrols a continuous line was formed and the position so much improved that when the enemy delivered a violent counter-attack at 11.45 p.m. it was firmly repulsed.

Attacks on Bourlon continued after the 23rd November.

On the 24th November 1917 in Bourlon Wood the 119th Brigade had been reinforced so an enemy attack about 8.45 a.m. was beaten off, shelling of the wood continued followed by a second attack with the fighting growing heavier all day.  Outnumbered and very weary the British maintained the struggle. The equivalent of 6 British battalions most of them tired and thinned by casualties had met about 8 German battalions mainly fresh troops to retain a hold on the wood.

The attack of the 121st Brigade on Bourlon village on the 24th November 1917 had been fixed for 12 noon but was revised to 3 p.m.  The 12 tanks allotted were judged too few and the decision was to postpone the attack until the 25th November but the order never reached the Brigade so led by the 12 tanks, the leading companies of the 120th Brigade attacked, many of the tanks reached and entered the village and destroyed machine-gun posts but as no infantry appeared to be following they withdrew.  Troops from the 14th Highland Light Infantry reached houses in Bourlon a little later and pushed on through Bourlon to the railway which formed the battalion objective but in the absence of support were cut off as between them and the remainder of the Brigade was the major part of the village with many Germans still in possession of the cellars and houses.

Fighting continued and on the 27th November 1917 following the failure of another attack on Bourlon village, General Sir Julian Byng gave instructions to cease the offensive as the Third Army’s means were exhausted.   Most of Bourlon Wood had been taken but the high ground to the west and Fontaine Ridge to the east had not.  This was less than satisfactory, for it gave the British no clearly defensible line.  Rather, they had secured a salient “a death trap in which it would have been impossible to keep troops especially artillery, without great loss and without the continual danger of their being cut off.”

Before the Commander in Chief could decide on withdrawal or not the enemy on the 30th November 1917 went on to the offensive at Cambrai.  Their object was to entrap the British troops in their newly won salient.  Although this was not achieved, the enemy inflicted heavy losses and by 10.30 a.m. on the 30th November had advanced 8 miles on the southern sector placing the enemy well beyond what had been the original British line prior to the commencement of the Cambrai offensive.  In the northern sector the British had been driven back to Flesquieres.  By the 3rd December both sides were prepared to call a halt but the German attack had left the British in a salient yet more difficult to hold and on the 7th December eventually Sir Douglas Haig authorised a withdrawal to a line which more or less coincided with the Hindenburg Support Line and included the defences at Flesquieres and Flesquires Ridge.

The casualties of the Battle of Cambrai came to approximately 47,000 British (of whom 12,000 were taken prisoner, mainly in the opening stages of the German attack on the 30th November) and 50,000 German (with a smaller percentage of prisoners).

Lance Corporal Arthur Perks was awarded the Victory and British War Medals.

Commemorated here

Captain Richard Mason
2nd Lieutenant Frank Stewart Phillips
2nd Lieutenant Charles Walter Tune
and the following 43 Other Ranks all killed in action on the 23rd November 1917 and who have no known grave and are all commemorated on the Cambrai Memorial.

No. 29684 Private Herbert James Baguley
No. 29428 Sergeant Sidney Bonnington
No. 24794 Private Herbert Briggs
No. 34486 Private Robert Brown
No. 23590 Sergeant William Irvin Brown, D.C.M., Croix-de-Guerre (see at end for details of the award of the D.C.M.)
No. 25486 Private John Butterworth
No. 235578 Private Fred Colpus
No. 29438 Private Frank Harry Evatt
No. 23558 Private George Oswald Fea
No. 22999 Private Arthur Foley
No. 29843 Private Elijah Garlick
No. 29827 Lance Sergeant Walter Goode
No. 40656 Private James Green
No. 24786 Private Harry Griffiths
No. 24657 Private Arthur Harrison M.M.
No. 235579 Private Willie Hesling
No. 29791 Private James William Hibbins
No. 41920 Corporal Alban Jarman
No. 24680 Private Mark Albert Johnson
No. 25584 Lance Corporal Joseph Kennedy
No. 25474 Lance Corporal Robert Smith Kitchen
No. 25631 Lance Corporal John Alfred Lee
No. 235584 Private Albert Edward Lumb

No. 25677 Private Michael Marr
No. 25542 Private William Monagham
No. 41827 John Ogden
No. 41678 Private William O’Hare
No. 42431 Lance Corporal Arthur Edgar Perks
No. 29720 Private Frank Porter
No. 42455 Private James William Read
No. 29631 Private Tom Riley
No. 12282 Private Harry Routledge
No. 34055 Private John McGill
No. 23536 Private John Simmonds
No. 29799 Corporal Cecil Simpson
No. 29588 Lance Corporal Charles James Smith
No. 42442 Private Reuben Bartrum Smith
No. 25612 Private Ernest Atkinson Tate
No. 235604 Private James Henry Terry
No. 25620 Private James Thompson
No. 23691 Lance Sergeant Jesse Tindall
No. 23757 Lance Corporal Fred Walker
No. 41703 Private Harold Watson

For the Distinguished Conduct Medal awarded to William Brown the Citation in the London Gazette dated 14th November 1916 records:
“For conspicuous gallantry in action.  When our raiding party were attacked, he proceeded along the parapet and by his skilful use of bombs held up the enemy.  Later he remained alone on the parapet and covered the retirement of the raiding party.  He displayed great courage and determination throughout.”

This was when the Battalion was in the Loos Sector.