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No. 8137 Private Harry Lewis Fearn 17th (Service) Battalion (2nd City) Manchester Regiment killed in action 30th July 1916 aged 20 years. He has no known grave and is commemorated on the Thiepval Memorial, Somme.
Harry Fearn was awarded the 1914 - 1915 Star, he having served in a theatre of war between 5th August 1914 and 31st December 1915, the silver British War Medal 1914 - 18 and the bronze Allied Victory Medal.
The bronze Memorial Plaque presented to the next of kin of those that died during the war commemorating the sacrifice of Harry Fearnis shown below.
Harry Fearn was born in 1897 and on the 31st March 1901 was aged 4 years and living at 29 Grimshaw Lane Newton Heath Manchester with his father, Charles William Fearn aged 39 years, employed as a Joiner and born in Brassington Derbyshire, his mother Ann Fearn aged 36 born in Manchester and his elder brothers John Morris Fearn aged 14 years and at work, and Charles Dobson Fearn aged 11 years, like Harry both born in Manchester.
He enlisted in Manchester.
By about 1920 Charles William Fearn had died and Harry’s mother Ann Fearn was living at 310 Oldham Road Newton Heath Manchester.
The 17th Battalion was raised at Manchester on the 28th August 1914 by the Lord Mayor and City, by April 1915 was at Belton Park Grantham in 90th Brigade 30th Division.
Belton Park, about 1,000 acres, was offered to the War Office at the beginning of the war by Baron Brownlow and recruits in the new Army were being turned into soldiers under the most pleasant imaginable conditions. Hundreds of tents were erected to accommodate some 15,000 to 20,000 men from regiments such as the Dublin Fusiliers, Northumberland Fusiliers, the Manchester, Lincolnshire and Dorset Regiments and the Royal Engineers.
In the 90th Brigade, in addition to the 17th Battalion of the Manchester Regiment, were the 16th, 18th and 19th Battalions of the Manchester Regiment until 21st December 1915 when the 19th Battalion went to the 21st Brigade 30th Division and its place in 90th Brigade was taken by the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers. The 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th Battalions were first designated as the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th City Battalions of the Regiment.
The 20th, 21st and 22nd Battalions of the Manchester Regiment (with later the 23rd Battalion) constituted the 91st Brigade, the two Brigades being the Manchester Pals.
Between 6th and 12th November 1915 the first seven battalions of the Manchester Pals arrived in France all save the 19th Battalion, which landed at Le Havre, landing at Boulogne.
The 17th Battalion travelled from Folkestone to Boulogne on the 8th November and then on the 9th November went south to Pont Remy south-east of Abbeville on the Somme River and was in the Somme area training until early December undergoing routine trench instruction including a period between the 9th and 11the December with companies manning the trench lines at Fonquevillers.
Private Harry Fearns landed in France on the 25th December 1915 and by January 1916 he had joined the 17th Battalion which with the other battalions in the 30th Division was in the area of Maricourt on the extreme right of the British sector of the Western Front. The boundary between the British Fourth Army and the French Sixth Army was to the east of the village of Maricourt with the front line about half a mile to the North. About a mile west of Maricourt was Carnoy, also in British hands: to the North was the German front line incorporating the fortified village of Fricourt to the West and about a mile back from the German front line the similarly fortified villages of Mametz and Montauban.
The 16th and 17th Battalions of the Manchester Regiment alternated in holding the front line trenches with the men’s billets being located at Suzanne about 2 miles South of the line and situated above the Somme River.
On the 9th January 1916 the 17th Battalion reached Suzanne for the first time just as the village was being shelled and sustained six casualties. On the 10th January the 17th Battalion relieved the 16th Battalion Manchester Regiment in the front lines west of Maricourt.
In the period from mid March until May 1916 as well as training for the forthcoming Battle of the Somme the Battalion with others in the Brigade was used for labouring in connection with railway track laying, road works, constructing new fire trenches and “jumping off” trenches and burying telephone connections six feet below ground level.
West of Amiens and well in the rear sector the whole of the Montauban area had been reproduced with trenches dug following aerial photographs representing the whole of the objectives to be attacked by each Brigade of the Divisions of XIII Corps, but Lieut-General W. N. Congreve’s H.Q. at Corbie became concerned when, because of the labouring work required by the infantry battalions, Brigades of the 18th Division (attacking in the area of Carnoy alongside the 30th Division) had been able to get an average of ten days practice over these model trenches, whilst those of the 30th Division had achieved an average of six days.
On the 1st June 1916 the result of a complex relief was the French XXth Corps took over the trenches formerly the responsibility of 90th Brigade resulting in the boundary between the British and French Armies bisecting what little was left of the village of Maricourt.
On the 1st July 1916 the 89th Brigade, the 90th Brigade and the 21st Brigade of the 30th Division were to attack on a frontage of about 2000 yards. The 89th Brigade on the right was to attack at Zero hour from North of the village of Maricourt with the French directly to their right. The 21st Brigade was also to attack at Zero on the left of the frontage from a start line about 750 yards in front of the start line for the 90th Brigade who were attack at Zero + 1 hour with a view to the battalions of the 90th Brigade passing through the battalions of 21st Brigade to attack and capture the village of Montauban.
On the 24th June 1916 the Allied bombardment began with a view to the attack commencing on the 28th June but on both the 27th and 28th June there was rain with overcast and cloudy conditions interfering with aeroplane work so the start date was put back to 1st July. Fourth Army was wrong about the destruction of dug-outs and the wire in the German lines but in front of 30th Division the position looked more favourable – on the 27th June it was reported that all the German wire was cut in the front line and the destruction was progressing satisfactorily in the second and third lines. A raid carried out on the night of the 29th June by men of the 19th Manchester Battalion revealed the German front line had been practically levelled by the British bombardment and no enemy were seen there.
To the west of Maricourt there were two copses, Cambridge Copse about 1000 yards from the German line with Oxford Copse about 250 yards further back. The 17th Battalion arrived in its assembly position in Cambridge Copse about 10 p.m. on the 30th June, the 16th Manchester Battalion arriving about midnight in their assembly position just to the west of Cambridge Copse. Behind both Battalions was the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers in support and behind the Fusiliers the 18th Manchesters in reserve in front of Oxford Copse. At Zero, 730 a.m. on the 1st July, the 21st Brigade left their assembly trenches and their principal objective was Glatz Redoubt about half way to Montauban village with Train Alley and Alt Trenches to its left and Dublin Trench to its right. Glatz Redoubt had been formed by the enemy by establishing a strong point by isolating a sector of the trenches by means of all-round wire and trench-blocks. The enemy had been caught in dugouts by the final bombardment and a soldier with the 19th Battalion told of numerous Germans running towards the British lines with hands up; those who remained throwing bombs and firing were killed by the advancing British troops. The Manchesters had few casualties but the 18th Kings (Liverpool) Regiment and the 2nd Green Howards in support were caught by enfilade machine-gun fire sustaining severe casualties, few of the Green Howards getting across No Mans Land. However by 835 a.m. the 21st Brigade had reached Glatz Redoubt and were joined by elements of the 89th Brigade attacking on their left so securing their objectives.
At 830 a.m. the 16th and 17th Battalions left their assembly trenches faced with crossing almost two miles across an area cratered by shell fire and swept by machine gun fire and bursts of shrapnel shell. 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers followed in close support. A machine gun in the German held trench Breslau Alley running south west from Montauban had taken a heavy toll of men in the 18th Division advancing to the left of 30th Division. This gun swung round to take in enfilade the 30th Division’s attack. The commanding Officer of the 17th Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Johnson, was hit within a quarter of a mile from the assembly trenches with command passing to Major Macdonald. Shrapnel bursts caused many casualties but the British artillery fire had been so effective it was impossible to locate the German front line, the second line being just a ditch with craters and piles of fresh earth the continuous shellfire meaning there was no problem with any uncut wire. The Battalions passed Alt Trench soon after 9 a.m. and were faced with the machine gun still firing from their left. However its precise location was established and the gun and its team were attacked and destroyed by the Lewis gun team from the 16th Manchesters. The attack was facilitated by a dense smoke-screen and a modified creeping barrage – one that crept between trench lines and then halted until the designated time for the next lift which pauses may have delayed the progress of the troops. German diaries state that the smoke cloud was so thick in Montauban and Caterpillar Valley that one could see only two or three yards ahead. The trench to the south of Montauban was well-sited but the Germans made no effort to defend it and the village was entered by the Manchesters and Scots Fusiliers at just after 10 a.m. “It was deserted – except for a fox – and a scene of complete devastation.” The front line pressed on through the ruins with the second line hurrying up close behind. By 11 a.m. as the last of the smoke cloud dispersed, the part of Montauban Alley beyond the northernmost houses in the village, the last objective, was entered, the Germans still there (some hundred in all) mostly surrendering without a fight. Montauban had been almost obliterated by the British and French artillery with no recognisable ruins although there had been 274 houses before the war. One of the French 240 mm. (9 inch) mortar batteries had fired on Montauban for the whole 7 days of the bombardment. Down in deep dugouts only a few of which had escaped the heavy shells cowering men in grey uniforms were captured with dead and dying Germans among the brick dust and rubble. An artillery command dug-out had been shelled and the occupants killed which disorganised the control of fire. One dug-out was full of dead whom there had been no opportunity for a week to bury. Montauban Alley to the north was the most advanced position captured by the British on the 1st July. To the North West of Montauban was Caterpillar Wood, the Valley taking its name from that wood (so named because of its caterpillar like shape) and the British could see several hundreds of Germans streaming northwards along the Bazentin le Grand road and Artillery fire was brought down upon them. Men of the 16th Manchesters rushed and captured German field artillerymen driven from their guns in caterpillar Valley and brought back the first three guns taken in the Somme battle.
The late afternoon of the 1st July was quiet, the bombardment of Montauban ceased and only a single German gun shelled Montauban Alley at extreme range slowly and inaccurately. German reserves were seen from the air advancing between Trones and Bernafay Woods (some 2000 yards to the East of Montauban) and as the light failed all fighting ceased, although at about 9.30 p.m. a small party of Germans approached Montauban from a quarry in Caterpillar Valley north of the village who were driven off by rifle and machine gun fire, this party of some 150 men having apparently hidden in the quarry until night fell.
That night the men of both the Manchester Battalions were able to construct and revet trenches, particularly those facing to the East of Montauban under seaching German artillery fire which increased dramatically about 3 a.m. on the 2nd July when German infantry began an attack but they were held off by rifle fire from both Battalions until SOS rockets sent up immediately on the launch of the German attack were responded to after 15 minutes by the British artillery which broke up the German force except for a small party who got into the detached post held by men from A Company of the 17th Battalion at Triangle Point. This post was held until their supply of grenades ran out and then they attempted to retire, only three of whom got back and two of these were wounded. That was the last German counter-attack leaving the Manchester Battalions holding the village.
By the early morning of the 2nd July the 16th Manchesters were relieved by the 2nd Wiltshire Regiment but the 17th Battalion had to wait until early on the 3rd July before their place was taken by the 12th Royal Scots.
The 17th Battalion had 8 officer casualties and 350 men leaving a total battalion strength of 450 of all ranks.
On relief the 17th Battalion went back to bivouac in Happy Valley, also known as Death Valley, which runs from South of Maricourt and West of the now D197 road towards Suzanne on the North bank of the Somme River. Whilst there replacement drafts arrived but few were from the Manchester Regiment.
1st July 1916 was a disastrous day for the British Army. Only in the south of the 16 mile front of attack had most of the objectives been secured albeit the Fourth Army was still not within striking distance of the German second line and none of the high ground of the Thiepval – Ginchy ridge facing the British and from which the Germans retained observation over the British front had been taken. In the north where the German second line and the ridge were much closer to the British front line no gains had been made at all. However the question was not whether the offensive should be continued but in which sector should the attack be renewed. Initially the Commander of the Fourth Army, General Rawlinson, proposed renewing the attack in the centre and on the left where the 1st July offensive had failed, ignoring exploiting the gains on the right but Douglas Haig wanted the major effort to be in the area of Longueval and Bazentin le Grand.
On the 3rd July 1916 a meeting took place between Marshal Joseph Joffre (French Commander in Chief), Sir Douglas Haig (British Commander in Chief) and Sir Henry Rawlinson (Commander 4th Army) when Joffre “ordered” Haig to attack to secure Thiepval and Pozieres to secure a footing on the Thiepval – Ginchy ridge. By the 3rd July Haig appreciated that the shattered state of VIII and X Corps meant neither was capable of any further effort leaving the only option, an attack in the south with or without French participation and so work began on the planning of a major operation in the southern sector the object being to gain the German second line but it was necessary as a preliminary to that operation that a line within attacking distance of the German second line needed to be established with objectives including Bernafay Wood, Mametz Wood, Trones Wood, la Boisselle and Contalmaison secured . Then it was hoped the way to attack the German second line from Bazentin-le-Grand to Longueval would be open but the prerequisites for that operation were that Mametz Wood and Trones Wood should be in British hands to secure the flanks for the German second line operation. So in the period between the 3rd and 13th July ten divisions of the Fourth Army launched 46 attacks against the German positions, 30th Divisions casualties in this period being 2,300.
On the 3rd July units from the King’s Own Scottish Borderers and Royal Scots occupied Bernafay Wood to the East of Montauban almost without opposition but patrols sent out to Trones Wood, East of Bernafay Wood, showed Trones Wood was strongly held by German machine-gun detachments.
In the period from the 8th to the 11th July 1916 Trones Wood was attacked by one Battalion from the 30th Division (except on the 11th when two Battalions were involved) and then on the 13th July by two Battalions from the 18th Division all of which failed mainly from enfilade fire from German strongpoints along a railway line which ran through the wood. Finally at 4 a.m. on the 14th July two Battalions from the 18th Division directed an attack on the now identified location of these strongpoints with the result being Trones Wood was cleared and occupied by British forces.
The attack on the 8th July was made by units of the 21st Brigade of the 30th Division who obtained a tenuous hold on part of Trones Wood the southern part of the wood being shelled throughout the afternoon and evening when it became clear that the involvement of another Brigade was required which led to the 17th Manchesters and the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers moving forward at about 1.00 a.m. on the 9th July. Zero hour was 3.00 am on the 9th July, following a 40 minute bombardment by British artillery with the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers attacking on the right, with the 17th Manchesters on their left who were due to advance out of Bernafay Wood either side of the light railway which then passed north eastwards through Trones Wood then turned East to run to the North of the German stronghold of Guillemont village.. Using a sunken road the Fusiliers reached the centre of Maltz Horn Trench before rushing the ruins of Maltz Horn Farm, 67 Germans surrendering from the farm itself. The Fusiliers began consolidation by digging a trench but also were able to bomb northwards up Maltz Horn Trench capturing 2 machine guns and 110 prisoners from the German trench with 40 or 50 of the enemy being killed. By 7 am the whole trench as far as its meeting the track which ran south of Trones Wood itself, the track turning North to follow the edge of the wood before turning East into the centre of Guillemont village.
The 17th Manchesters objective was to clear the centre and northern portions of Trones Wood itself however German gas shelling of Bernafay Wood meant the troops had to wear their gas respirators the eye pieces becoming misted by the drizzling rain and the guides lost direction so it was not until about 6.00 am that the leading lines emerged into the open yet with only a few shots fired at them and following a tiring struggle among the undergrowth, shell-holes and fallen trees the Manchesters reached the eastern edge of the wood to join with the Scots Fusiliers and push patrols northward. Contact was also made with the remnants of the 18th Battalion of the Manchesters, of the 21st Brigades attack the previous day, who had been called to support the 17th Battalion attack. Central Trench and dugouts within the northern portion of the wood were taken without difficulty and by 8.00 am 17th Battalion HQ was established in Central Trench with companies holding the eastern and northern perimeters of the Wood. Apart from nests of German troops the whole of Trones Wood was now in British hands but it was not long to remain so.
The enemy began a systematic shelling of the wood and its western approaches; from 12.30 pm onwards fire was concentrated from a large number of German artillery batteries deployed on the crescent of high ground from Maurepas (east of Hardecourt and south of Combles) to Bazentin-le-Grand. Only the southern part of the wood, sheltered by the lie of the land, escaped. On the eastern edge the 17th Manchesters suffered severely and as the left flank of the battalion was unsecured and an enemy counter-attack apparently imminent, at 3.00 pm a withdrawal to Bernafay Wood was ordered. The movement was carried out at once, but the order did not reach an outpost of 40 men the runner being killed. That party was either killed or captured. The 18th Manchesters and the Scots Fusiliers then also had to withdraw, the Fusiliers blocking Malt Horn Trench just clear of the wood itself.
The 17th Battalion had gone back about 1,000 yards to a sunken road where troops dug holes in the banks to try and get protection from the almost ceaseless shrapnel shelling. It numbered only about 100. On the night of the 10th/11th July the 90th Brigade was relieved by the 89th Brigade but even before that relief a party from the 17th Manchesters had been ordered forward again to occupy a trench south of Trones Wood which they did for 3 hours before being ordered to retire again.
In the period 3rd to 13th July planning had begun for the operation to capture the German Second Line in the southern sector, specifically to capture and consolidate Bazentin le Grand Wood and village, Bazentin le Petit Wood and village, Longueval and Delville Wood and in a separate operation to seize Trones Wood.
The attack on the 14th July was an undoubted success with the Fourth Army having breached the German Second Line from Bazentin le Petit Wood in the west to Longueval in the east. In British hands were the Bazentin villages and woods, Trones Wood and the southern part of Longueval village but sections of the ridge particularly Pozieres, High Wood and Delville Wood remained in German hands and the enemy was secure in its possession of their Second Line from Ginchy southwards and the new Switch Line which ran from Pozieres through High Wood to south of Flers. Although the gap in the German line was some three miles, before a general advance could be effected, the left wing of the British forces had to push out in the Pozieres direction and the right wing had to take Ginchy and Guillemont.
Ginchy was north-east of Guillemont and stood on a high plain being an important forward position in the German Second Line. Before it could be attacked Guillemont had to be captured. Guillemont was also a village on high ground and a strongpoint in the German Second Line. It was surrounded by trench systems and strongpoints at the railway station and a quarry and a particular nearby trench bastion the “Quadrilateral” with concrete machine-gun emplacements. Approach could only be made down a slope and then up again across a bare valley devoid of cover and admirable for defence.
Attacks were mounted against Guillemont and its immediate defences by some Nine Divisions, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 16th, 20th, 24th, 30th and 55th, in the period between 23rd July and its eventual capture on the 3rd September 1916.
On the 23rd July 1916 Guillemont was attacked by the 21st Brigade of the 30th Division. In this sector, the British artillery had good observation over the German defences. Consequently the British bombardment caused great damage to the German trench lines and, in most cases, the German wire. The 19th Manchesters attacked on the right beginning at 3.40 am advancing from the eastern face of Trones Wood in the face of heavy rifle, machine gun fire and artillery fire. “A” Company of the Battalion got into the German front line trench north of the village but charges by groups of men and officers failed and the remnants fell back into the German trench. Another Company, “C” attacked alongside the Guillemont road entering the village by the church. “D” Company had been unable to get through the German wire south of the road and the situation quickly became untenable with “C” Company being surrounded and cut off. However whilst the British bombardment had caused damage to the German trench lines, the German machine-gunners had changed their tactics because of previous well-directed British bombardments and instead of remaining in the trench-lines, they had moved to shell-holes clear of their trenches so that the British artillery now had no clear German trench line to bombard but had to bombard a whole area of ground using an immense amount of ammunition to destroy the German defenders.
At 6.00 am it was clear these unsupported attacks against the Guillemont position were doomed to fail particularly following a German counter-attack by storm-troops and with the German machine-gunners in shell-holes on the flanks of the attack opening up on the British attackers. The attackers had therefore to pull back but a withdrawal to the start position outside Trones Wood was in itself fraught with danger being exposed to German machine gun and shell fire, a particularly heavy German barrage falling on No Man’s Land. In the event the 19th Battalion sustained 571 casualties.
The date for the next attempt to capture the village of Guillemont was initially set for the 25th July. On the 22nd July the 16th, 17th and 18th Manchesters left Happy Valley for Mansel Copse and then moved further forward to Cambridge Copse, moving on the 23rd July to a position behind Bernafay Woood when patrols went out to reconnoitre the land in front of Guillemont. On the 24th July the attack was postponed to the 27th July, on the 25th postponed to the 28th, on the 26th postponed again and then on the 28th the whole plan was scrapped and another substituted.
The 30th Division was to attack with the 89th Brigade advancing in touch with the French on the right with objectives Falfemont Farm, some distance south-east of Guillemont village, and the German second position north-west of the Farm as far as the southern edge of Guillemont village, the objective of the 90th Brigade. Guillemont station to the north west of the village itself and the German trenches north-west of the station were the objectives of the 5th Brigade of 2nd Division.
Maltzhorn Farm on the right of the line of advance of 89th Brigade was in German hands but at zero hour, 04.45 am, the Farm was captured by a company of the 2nd Bedfordshire with a company of the French 153rd Regiment, with over 60 Germans being killed. The advance continued with German front trenches being overrun and the attackers reached the Hardecourt – Guillemont road but sustained heavy losses from machine-gun fire and began to consolidate the line gained. A party from the 19th Kings reached an orchard on the south-eastern outskirts of Guillemont but by early afternoon developing German counter-attacks drove all the British units back and the only gain held was the line from Arrow Head Copse along the sunken Hardecourt – Guillemont road to Maltz Horn Farm where the right was in touch with the French.
The 5th Division units were to advance from the Waterlot Farm area between Longueval and Guillemont to the railway station but whilst machine-gun fire from the now captured Delville Wood protected the left flank of the British attack, German bombing and machine-gun posts had survived the bombardment and whilst some of the Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry came close to the station, all were killed or captured and eventually all the troops were withdrawn to their start lines under heavy German shell-fire.
The 16th, 17th and 18th Battalions of the Manchester Regiment were all to be involved in the attack and the troops advanced late on the evening of the 29th July to the assembly trenches in front of and within Trones Wood. Many of the 17th Battalion’s men were exhausted having been out all of the night of 28th/29th July digging and deepening these assembly trenches. A heavy German bombardment on the Trones Wood area fell on these assembling troops and at dawn a thick fog, which did not clear until after 8 a.m., reduced visibility to 40 yards.
The left flank of the 90th Brigades attack was to be by the 16th Manchesters whose initial objective was the railway north-west of Guillemont. Zero hour was at 04.45 a.m. and the battalion’s guides were early casualties and the men were unable due to the onset of daylight to make use of previously taped lines out in the open abut nearer to the objectives. Still a steady advance was made towards the railway but the troops perhaps because of the fog veered to the right heading towards the quarry on the western edge of the village coming across German wire and then German machine-gun fire from both the station and the quarry drove them back to the Guillemont road a few yards in front of Trones Wood.
The 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers and the 18th Manchesters advanced astride the Trones Wood – Guillemont track, the Fusiliers entering the village without much loss and capturing 50 Germans. They waited for the barrage which was to traverse the village in four lifts then pushed on to the north-eastern edge of the village where consolidation began with a party of the 18th Manchesters, that Battalion having advanced with the Trones Wood – Guillemont railway on its left, had taken many prisoners on reaching the German front line trench. Most of the 18th Manchesters remained however in the west of the village under heavy machine-gun fire from the quarry. A German defensive artillery barrage west of Guillemont with the machine-gun fire from the quarry ensured few reinforcements or ammunition could reach the troops in Guillemont although some men from the 17th Manchesters had by 0745 a.m. managed to get up to support the 18th’s men in the west of the village. No information was getting back and the British barrage concentrated on the far and eastern side of Guillemont and this left German bombers, machine-gunners and riflemen hidden in the orchards on the western fringe unchallenged and able to shoot many of the 17th Manchesters crowded in the gap in the wire in the sunken lane in front of Guillemont.
During the morning some troops from the 23rd Manchesters managed about 0800 to get water and bombs up to the Scots Fusiliers and Very Lights and rockets at 1000 but this was the last that was heard of those Fusilier companies in the village who cut off by the German defensive barrage and deprived of all support and assistance were eventually overwhelmed by German counter-attacks. At about 2.30 pm a party of the 18th Manchesters cut off and fired on from all sides in the south western part of Guillemont surrendered.
The 17th Manchesters who were in front of the village or had actually managed to get into the village itself were ordered to retire and had to go back over 800 yards of open ground swept by German machine gun fire. A small number got back to shelter in the trenches along the eastern edge of Trones Wood when the whole area was intensively shell by the enemy artillery as dusk fell.
The village of Guillemont, the station and the quarry remained in German hands.
That night the forward troops of both the 30th and 35th Divisions were relieved by the 55th Division the remnants of the Manchester Battalions marching back to the Citadel.
The 18th Battalion of the Manchester Regiment had 102 men killed in action and 5 officers: of these Captain P A Blythe and Lieutenant P G Haworth are buried in Delville Wood Cemetery while the remainder, 2nd Lieutenants E Kavanagh, P R King and F C O Twist have no known grave and are commemorated on the Thiepval Memorial.
The 17th Battalion of the Manchester Regiment had 46 men but no officers killed in action and Private Harry Fearn was one of those killed.
A Majority have no known grave, 31 of those killed in action being commemorated on the Thiepval Memorial. 1 casualty is buried in Peronne Road Cemetery Maricourt. Another is buried in A.I.F. Burial Ground, Grass Lane, Flers, a cemetery enlarged post the Armistice. 4 casualties are buried in Delville Wood Cemetery, Longueval, wholly constructed post the Armistice. 3 are buried in Dantzig British Cemetery, Mametz, another cemetery enlarged post the Armistice and 12 in Serre Road Cemetery No. 2, Beaumont Hamel another cemetery enlarged post the Armistice. There are 5 casualties whose place of burial or commemoration is not ascertained.
After the flawed attack of the 23rd July it seemed to local commanders that an assault against the Guillemont position from the west was doomed to failure particularly if not supported by an attack in force across the heads of the Maurepas ravine.
Guillemont was finally captured in an operation on the 3rd September 1916 by 20th Division (with an attached 47th Brigade from the 16th (Irish) Division) attacking from the north. A heap of discoloured rubble was all that remained of Guillemont although underneath the rubble were the deep-mined dug-outs sheltering the German infantry.
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